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SAUL B. KLAMAN*

I
INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM AND THE SETTING

A. General Approaches
In z965, the establishment of the Department of Housing and Urban Development gave promise of a new era in urban housing policies and programs. In the
preceding three decades or so since the Great Depression, federal intervention in
housing and mortgage markets had broadened and deepened-through war and
peace, through business expansion and contraction. Now, endowed with cabinet
status, federal housing policy-makers were given a voice in the highest councils of
government. There could be no doubt of the nation's permanent commitment to
housing progress in the setting of an improved urban structure. As Dr. Robert
Weaver observed, shortly after his appointment as the first Secretary of HUD:
"The national role in urban problem-solving is large and growing."'
In 1966, however, the nation's housing and mortgage markets were in disarray.
The output of new housing fell to a postwar low. Sales of existing housing dropped
to uncommonly low levels. Residential mortgage credit virtually dried up, with
net mortgage extensions down forty per cent on a year-to-year basis by year-end.
New federal urban revitalization programs were lagging for lack of adequate
financing. The national role in urban problem-solving, while undoubtedly large
and growing, was only marginally effective in the face of devastating short-run
problems.
In 1967, therefore, we have been inundated with proposals to improve the role of
government in urban housing and mortgage markets, to make it more effective in
short-run as well as long-run urban problem-solving. New federal approaches to
long-range urban rebuilding problems, particularly those related to housing for lowincome families, have been urged by legislators, planners, and economists alike.
And accompanying the new and renewed public approaches, there have been
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numerous proposals to improve the efficiency of the private market through structural and institutional changes.

B. A Balanced Perspective
Quite apart from the technical merits of specific approaches to short- and longrun urban problems, it is essential from the policy viewpoint that the relative
roles of the public and private sectors be kept in balanced perspective. Federal
involvement in the revitalization of our urban environment, in mortgage finance, in
housing production and transfer, is dearly great and growing. Private enterprise
must surely recognize and accept the key role of government in the building and
rebuilding of our urban complex. But government must also appreciate, and indeed
welcome, the indispensable role of private enterprise in this gigantic venture.
What is needed, in essence, if we are successfully to revitalize the quality of
urban life in America, if we are to find solutions to recurring mortgage and housing
problems, is to establish a creative partnership between the private and public
sectors of our society. Such a partnership would have its parallel in the "creative
federalism" proposed between federal and state and local governments. Such a
partnership would seek the realization of broadly accepted public goals through
maximum reliance on private means.
It cannot be said, unfortunately, that a well-balanced public/private approach has
been characteristic of our urban housing and mortgage programs, policies, and
proposals. Among the current maze of mortgage proposals, for example, designed
to prevent the recurrence of "another 1966," one can detect efforts to insulate or
shelter the flow and terms of housing credit from private market forces, efforts to
assure, in a sense, an artificially regulated "ever-normal" flow of funds to finance
housing needs. Such an approach is doomed at the outset; it presumes the failure
of the private market place.
A balanced approach, as envisioned here, must be based on the fundamental
premise that insulation of the mortgage sector from the discipline of the private market
is neither practical nor desirable. The mortgage sector must be geared to compete
more effectively for scarce funds in the forum of the market place, and to release
funds to other sectors when the flow of mortgage credit is excessive relative to,
basic demands. For the flow of credit to be allocated efficiently among competing
private market sectors, however, basic adjustments are needed in public policies
and programs-federal, state, and local-which influence mortgage flows and housing
activity.
Let me stress at this point that the objective of maximizing the participation
of the private sector in the revitalization of our cities, and in the modernization of
our mortgage structure, is more than just a basic maxim of a private market system.
It is a realistic approach to the massive task involved. It recognizes the practicality
of using existing private institutional arrangements, funds, and skills. It recognizes

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

that major reliance on the public sector for needed funds would severely strain the
federal budget and administrative structure. The broad, basic goal of public policy
in the mortgage and housing area must, therefore, be to encourage and to supplement-not to preempt-the use of private resources.
Against this general policy setting of public/private approaches to urban housing
and mortgage problems, the body of this article is divided into two major segments: (i) tentative solutions to recurring short-run mortgage crises; and
range considerations of federal urban policy.

(2)

long-

II
TENTATIVE SOLUTIONS

TO RECURRING MORTGAGE CRISES

A. The Problems of Plenitude and Shortage
The 1966 "credit crisis" dramatized the particular vulnerability of the housing
and mortgage sectors to cyclical economic change. Earlier periods of credit
stringency in the i95os had also demonstrated, although less dramatically, the
inability of real estate market participants to compete for scarce funds. But while
the most acute problems in the housing credit area have been associated with painful scarcities of funds, they should not obscure the problems associated with excessive
mortgage flows. In fact, during the first half of the i96os, financial observers were
-concerned about the deterioration in the quality of housing credit, as mortgage foreclosure rates rose steeply.
In short, the experience of the past decade or so graphically illustrates the unsettling tendency of the residential mortgage sector to swing widely and rapidly
from a "plenitude of abundance" to a "plenitude of scarcity." A basic aim of
private and public policies, therefore, should be to reduce the volatility of mortgage
flows over the business cycle. On balance, this will provide more credit for
housing than during alternating periods of feast and famine.
In seeking fundamental solutions, one must identify fundamental causes for
the virtual breakdown of the residential mortgage market in 1966, and for the surfeit

of mortgage funds in the preceding years of the 196os. The more immediate and
short-run causes lie in the impact of changing business and financial conditions and
of government policies. There is no need to provide a detailed chronology of these
events. This is available from several other sources. But a brief review will
help set the stage for a discussion of the more fundamental, long-run structural
problems.
B. The Immediate Factors
The economic environment of the early i96os was conducive to an excessive flow
of mortgage credit relative to basic housing demands. Expansionary monetary
policies, relative price and interest rate stability, high and rising employment and
incomes, and intensified competition for savings accounts, resulted in record deposit
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flows at thrift institutions and commercial banks. Because of their restricted
loan and investment powers, thrift institutions-particularly savings and loanschanneled their record-breaking saving flows into mortgage markets, even though
overall housing demands were relatively sluggish. And commercial banks in this
period, faced with the high costs of time deposits in a period of inadequate
business loan demand, turned strongly to home mortgage loans (together with
municipal securities) as a source of income.
The result was a greater acceptance of marginal credit risks, steadily liberalized
mortgage contract terms, excessively high property appraisals, and encouragement
of marginal building operations. The quality of credit was clearly being strained.
Evidence of deterioration was later apparent in mounting mortgage delinquencies
and foreclosures, and in the rising "scheduled items" at several savings and loan
2
associations.
By mid-i 965, the situation had changed significantly, however, culminating in
the near credit crisis of late 1966. With the nation's physical and human resources
virtually fully employed, continued vigorous business expansion put the economy
under severe strain. Persistent credit demands from business, governments, and
consumers pushed open market interest rates to the highest levels in forty years
by late summer of 1966. Of course, this was due in part to the especially restrictive
monetary policy stance taken by the Federal Reserve Board. In the absence of
adequate fiscal restraints, severe monetary stringency was employed as the only effective and-inflationary weapon.
In this environment, saving flows fell sharply at thrift institutions, where deposit
interest rates were not competitive with open market yields or with special commercial bank savings instruments. Savings and loan associations sustained a fiftyseven per cent drop in net saving flows between 1965 and 1966. Their 1966 flow was
the smallest in fourteen years and less than the amount of dividends credited to
savings accounts. At mutual savings banks, 1966 deposit flows were down twentynine per cent from 1965, with the bulk of the gain reflecting the crediting of interestdividends.
In marked contrast to developments at mortgage-oriented institutions, saving
flows into commercial banks held up quite well in 1966, falling only about thirteen
per cent from the high 1965 level. The ability of commercial banks to turn over
short-term assets quickly, and invest in new high-interest obligations, permitted them
to pay attractive rates to depositors. The result was soaring sales of savings certificates and other consumer-type time deposits which substantially offset reduced
gains in regular passbook savings, bearing relatively low rates under Regulation Q
ceilings 3 And except for the regulatory roll-back of "consumer C/D" interest
IPreliminary findings of a National Bureau of Economic Research study on quality of credit (not
available for publication at this time) confirm the deterioration in credit quality in the early i96os.
ISee I2 C.F.R. § 217.6 (Supp. I966).
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rates in September 1966, commercial bank saving flows would undoubtedly have
been larger.
All three major deposit-type institutions, of course, were locked in competitive
battle with high-flying capital market instruments. These were the immediate cause
of the dramatic "disintermediation" of 1966. Individuals channeled a record $ii
billion into all types of credit and equity market instruments-more than four times
the 1965 volume. They supplied directly almost one-sixth of the nation's total credit
demands in 1966, the highest share since 1957, compared with less than four per
cent in 1965.
In the face of sharply reduced saving flows, and mounting pressures on earnings
and liquidity positions, mortgage-oriented savings institutions drastically cut back
their new mortgage activity in 1966. Other credit markets remained well supplied,
however, partly because of the direct investment activity of individuals. The
severity of the mortgage cutback reflected also the large volume of outstanding
mortgage commitments and inventory of "warehoused" mortgage loans overhanging the market. These technical factors intensified pressures on institutional
lenders to curtail new commitments as saving flows turned sharply downward in
i966.
New home mortgage commitment and lending activity was also cut back by life
insurance companies in the face of sharply rising bond yields and lucrative returns
on income-property loans. Heavy demands for policy loans and reduced home
mortgage repayments in the stringent 1966 environment, moreover, reduced cash
flows available for home mortgage lending.
All things considered, the immediate factors underlying the 1966 "mortgage
crisis" were the unbalanced mix of monetary and fiscal policies, the selective impact
of severe financial stringency on mortgage-oriented savings institutions, and the
reinforcing influence of technical mortgage market factors. Under these circumstances, curtailed savings growth was quickly translated into sharply reduced mortgage and residential real estate activity. Conversely, in the earlier 196os when
financial ease and relatively low market interest rates stimulated savings growth,
mortgage flows soared to excessive levels, relative to housing demand, because savings
institutions were limited in their alternative investment opportunities. (The course
of these financial developments and their impact on mortgage and housing markets
is traced in figure i.)
C. Structural Problems and Programs
Underlying the immediate causes of recurring "mortgage crises," summarized
above, are deep-seated structural problems. And as long as these remain uncorrected, mortgage flows, housing activity, and urban rebuilding will remain susceptible to significant cyclical swings in the changing economic environment. The
greater danger in the years ahead, perhaps, is of a sustained shortage, rather than
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FIGURE i
FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO MORTGAGE STRINGENCY AND
HOUSING DECLINES IN 1966
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plenitude, of housing credit in the face of heavy capital demands for private and
public purposes. But whether the long-term trend indicates shortage or adequacy of
housing credit, the unsettling effects of cyclical mortgage instability, arising out of
structural problems, remain an ever-present danger.
What then are the basic structural problems which adversely affect the flow
of residential mortgage credit? In my judgment, they lie in three related areas:
(i) the fundamentally changing nature and inadequate structure of savings markets;
(2) the cumbersome nature of the mortgage instrument itself; and (3) the unrealistic federal-state regulatory and statutory framework in which the mortgage
market functions.
These interrelated problems call for an interrelated, integrated three-part program
to adapt existing mortgage-oriented savings institutions to the changed financial environment,
(2) to tap supplementary sources of mortgage credit through new market instruments, and'
(3) to adjust the role of government to the realities of the private market place.
(i)

i. Adapting Savings Institutions
Any program to strengthen and stabilize the flow of home mortgage credit in
the economy must be firmly anchored to the strengthening of mortgage-oriented
savings institutions. These institutions are, and will remain, the major suppliers
of home mortgage credit. When their inflow of savings is sharply reduced, as in
1966, so also is the flow of home mortgage credit. When their saving inflows are
large relative to suitable mortgage outlets, the quality of credit is threatened.
Moreover, dislocations generated in one period reinforce the problems of the next.
Improvement in the competitive strength and flexibility of thrift institutions
requires the restructuring of both their assets and liabilities. Savings institutions
must modify their "borrowing short lending long" policies. They cannot continue,
in effect, to promise "instant liquidity" from a basically illiquid balance sheet.
On the liabilities side, therefore, savings institutions must reduce their reliance
on the standard passbook savings account to attract funds. They need to supplement these accounts with a variety of higher-yielding saving plans which will limit
depositor liquidity, space out depositor claims, and offer higher rates for incremental
than for existing savings. Such plans will result in greater flexibility, better control
over withdrawals, reduced pressures on earnings, and increased competitive ability
to attract savings. Several supplementary savings plans have been developed in
recent years and are already in use, but on too limited a basis, both with respect
to amount of deposits and number of institutions.
Savings institutions must greatly expand the use, and innovate in the development, of such savings plans as (i) investment-type accounts, including savings
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certificates, (2) limited withdrawal accounts, requiring sixty to ninety days or more
notice, (3) split rate plans with higher rates for long-term accounts, (4) systematic
saving plans, with bonuses for regular saving over a period of years, and (5) annuitytype plans pointing toward regular payments in retirement years. In addition,
savings institutions must explore the possibilities of issuing debenture-type obligations in the open market to raise funds.
On the assets side of the balance sheet, savings institutions must be permitted
broadened loan and investment powers. On the surface, this may appear an
anomalous solution to mortgage credit problems, but it is essential to strengthen the
structure of the major mortgage credit suppliers. Broadened powers would increase
the viability of savings institutions, permit a more rapid adjustment of earnings to
rapid interest rate advances, enhance their ability to compete for savings with commercial banks and open market instruments, and hence permit them to meet more
effectively basic demands for mortgage credit in the economy. In essence, broadened
investment opportunities for savings institutions would mean first, lessened investment
risks and increased ability to strengthen long-run earning power and promote thrift
continuously. This is so because funds could be allocated more readily among
competing investments in accordance with highest yields (consistent with safety and
liquidity) while earnings would be more responsive in periods of rapid financial
change. These broadened investment opportunities would also mean a more stable
flow of mortgage funds over the business cycle. This is so because excessive mortgage credit expansion in periods of relatively low housing demand or rapid savings
growth would be avoided, while in other periods, demands for mortgage credit in
excess of savings growth could be met by the conversion of short-term loans and
other assets into mortgage loans.
These basic facts have been recognized by distinguished observers of the contemporary financial and economic scene. In a recent speech, Federal Reserve Governor Andrew F. Brimmer noted.'
A shift to broader lending capabilities by the savings and loans and savings banks ...
would create more general strength among financial institutions to adjust to
monetary stringency and thus help to spread the impact of monetary actions more
evenly throughout the financial sector.
And, in their 1967 Annual Report, the President's Council of Economic Advisers,
recommending federal charters for mutual savings banks, commented:5
While broadened investment privileges of federally chartered mutual savings banks
might initially divert some funds from the mortgage market, such chartered banks
would improve the efficiency of thrift institutions, strengthen them in competition
with banks, and thereby ultimately benefit the mortgage market.
'Address by Governor Brimmer, Annual Meeting of the Town Hall, Los Angeles, Cal., March 21, 1967.
5 x967 COUNCIL OF Ecovo, ic ADVISERS ANN. REP., in 1967 ECONoMic REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 27,
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The tangible advantages of asset flexibility for the mortgage market can be seen
clearly in the 1966 experience. Savings banks, with broader powers than savings
and loans, were able to channel io8 per cent of their net deposit gains into mortgage
loans. This was possible because inadequate deposit flows were supplemented by
funds from conversion of other assets and from repayments of non-mortgage loans.
Savings and loan associations, however, limited almost entirely to home mortgage
lending, were able to channel only eighty-four per cent of their net increase in
savings and borrowings into mortgage loans. These developments were explicitly
recognized by the Federal Reserve Board, in its 1966 Annual Report:"

While reduced net inflows at savings banks led to some reduction in mortgage
commitments and acquisitions, these declines were less severe than at savings and
loan associations. The ability of the mutual savings banks to better maintain their
mortgage acquisitions reflected not only their deposit experience but also their more
diversified portfolios, which permitted them to liquidate other securities in order to
limit the reduction in their mortgage lending.
Parenthetically, commercial banks placed only thirty-eight per cent of their net
savings and time deposit growth into mortgages, reflecting their fundamental
orientation towards the business loan sector.
While savings banks do have broader powers than savings and loans, both are
quite limited compared with commercial banks. Many savings banks and nearly all
savings and loans, for example, are denied the right to make consumer loans. Basic
legislation is required to achieve the desired broadening of powers. Such legislation
is now at hand in the form of the federal savings bank bill,7 sponsored by the
administration and now before the Congress. This bill authorizes flexible loan and
investment powers for federally-chartered savings banks and provides for the conversion of savings and loan associations into federal savings banks. The federal
savings bank bill appears to offer a sound and practical route to the achievement
of a strengthened mortgage-oriented system of savings institutions.
2.

Supplementary Mortgage Sources Through New Credit Instruments

If mortgage markets are to function more effectively, additional sources of credit
should be developed to supplement flows from traditional lenders, who will remain
the major source of funds. This objective will not easily be fulfilled, considering
the legally complex, economically cumbersome structure of mortgage finance.
The mortgage instrument reflects the complicated system of real estate transfer
and the highly differentiated, localized nature of real estate markets. To be sure,
government underwriting, through FHA insurance and VA guarantee, has given
the mortgage loan some of the attributes of a modern credit instrument-uniformity
o 53 BOARD O1 GOVERNORS OF THE PEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEMx ANN. REP. 6o (1966).
'S. I955, goth Cong., ist Sess. (1967); H.R. 10745, 9 oth Cong., ist Sess. (x967).
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and transferability. But even so, federally underwritten loans are not readily
classifiable or broadly marketable, or unfettered by technical servicing problems.
Nor does legislating some super-secondary market institution into existence to
provide "instant liquidity" offer an all-purpose solution to the need for broadened
credit sources. Even the multi-billion dollar, government-sponsored, Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) severely rationed secondary market transactions in 1966, because of fund limitations.
The difficulties notwithstanding, the advantages of dependable, supplementary
sources of mortgage funds in periods of credit stringency are so great that the effort
is worth making. Consumers and pension funds, in particular, represent two broad
investor groups which could be attracted into mortgage investments if suitable types
of credit instruments are developed.
In the case of consumers, there is ample evidence of their willingness to invest
directly in capital market instruments when yields are attractive relative to risk and
liquidity. As noted previously, consumers invested a record $ii billion in open
market securities during 1966, four times the 1965 volume. Needless to say, if part
of this large flow could have been attracted into the mortgage sector, the burden of
financial stringency would have been more evenly shared, and severe economic dislocations would have been lessened.
But the mortgage instrument and marketing channels are not now geared to
attract the sophisticated individual investor. There is need for a security-type mortgage instrument that would be competitive with other capital market securities. In
broad terms, such an instrument should be (I) made available in as wide a variety
of denominations and maturities as are other open market securities, (2) so designed
as to minimize competition with savings deposits and maximize competition with
other capital market instruments, and (3) marketed through privately-financed companies, organized perhaps as subsidiaries of financial intermediaries which would
purchase mortgages from the intermediaries and, in turn, sell securities to the public
backed by these mortgages.
In short, a relatively small-denomination, consumer-type mortgage participation
is required that would command public respect and confidence. A repetition of the
unhappy investor experience with mortgage guarantee bonds of the 1920S can be
avoided. In this regard, one need only note the favorable public reception to participation certificate offerings of FNMA and the Export-Import Bank in recent years.
The successful marketing of these instruments, which represent beneficial interests
in pools of government-owned assets, including mortgages, strongly suggests that,
under the right conditions, consumer response to a mortgage-type security would
be favorable.
A similar type of security-but in much larger denominations-could also attract
pension funds unwilling to deal in the cumbersome mortgage instrument itself.
There is already evidence that a large-denomination trust certificate, secured by a
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portfolio of federally underwritten mortgages, is being developed by mortgage
bankers for purchase by selected pension funds. If this approach proves feasible,
it will undoubtedly be more widely adopted.
3. Adjusting the Role of Government to Market Realities
Finally, at both the state and federal level, more realistic governmental policies
are needed to bring the mortgage market firmly into the twentieth century. Longstanding variations in state mortgage statutes governing foreclosure procedures, redemption periods and "doing business" penalties continue to hamper mortgage market
operations. As a practical matter, however, it is probably unrealistic to expect
significant improvement in these areas soon.
Shifts in state and federal attitudes toward interest rates, however, are within the
realm of possibility. There are at present ten states which impose a six per cent interest rate ceiling on mortgage loans. Such usury laws, enacted years ago, are clearly
in need of revision, with the prime rate at this level in 1966 and federal agencies
paying as much to borrow. Otherwise, severe dislocations will continue to occur in
local mortgage markets, as funds are diverted from low-interest-ceiling states in
periods of credit stringency.
The statutory interest rate ceiling on FHA-insured and VA-guaranteed loans is
also at six per cent, and rates up to this level are established by administrative action.
Discounts from contract rates are permitted, of course, but under such restrictive circumstances that federally underwritten mortgage flows and real estate transactions
are, as in 1966, severely affected when the general level of interest rates is high
and rising. The economic logic for completely free FHA and VA rates is unassailable, but the political barriers seem equally impenetrable. After years of unsuccessful
effort by many groups, I am prepared to concede that a free market rate for FHA
and VA loans is probably not attainable in the foreseeable future.
It does seem feasible, however, to achieve greater flexibility of FHA and VA contract interest rates by
(i) requiring the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development to adjust contract interest rates so as to minimize discounts at all times, even to the extent
of lifting the contract rate above six per cent when necessary,
(2) modifying the restriction that mortgage discounts cannot be recognized in
the price of properties, and
(3) relating FHA and VA mortgage rates to the movement of long-term U.S.
Government bond yields.
The last point runs into the difficulty of determining suitable yield spreads, of course,
particularly if regional mortgage rate variations are to be taken into account. But
the current uniform contract rate allows for no regional variations. The possibility
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of some increased interest rate flexibility, therefore, even on an imperfect basis, is most
appealing.
Among other possible federal policy adjustments, FNMA should not arbitrarily
restrict its secondary market purchases on the basis of loan size and date of
origination. Such restrictions, in effect, inequitably cut off higher-priced areas from
access to FNMA, as well as mortgage holders from selling existing loans to FNMA.
In a market economy, price should be more heavily relied on as the basic technique
for rationing scarce funds to the market place, and the liquidity needs of lenders
should not be so patently ignored. To do otherwise fails to recognize the interrelationship of new and existing house markets, and significantly weakens the role of FNMA
as a secondary market facility.
In sum, there is no single dramatic panacea for the problems which periodically
beset the mortgage market. A series of basic steps along the lines suggested here
seem to encompass a realistic approach-a broad-based attack on a multi-faceted
problem, with each segment reinforcing the other. Moreover, it should be emphasized that the overriding goal of policy and programs should be to help the mortgage market function more effectively within the private market place and not to
shelter it from the discipline of overall credit availability and price as determined
by private market forces.
III
PUBLIC/PRIVATE BALANCE IN URBAN REvITALIZATION

A. The Cost/Benefit Principle
At the outset of this article, it was suggested that effective solutions to urban mortgage and housing problems must rest on the creative partnership of the private and
public sectors. In this respect, it was stressed that a basic goal of public policy must
be to encourage and to supplement, not to preempt, the use of private resources.
A related principle of sound urban problem-solving, which must be recognized
at this point, is the cost/benefit balance in public finance. For this principle to be
observed in urban programs, it is clearly necessary for public financial assistance to be
openly recognized and disbursed so that costs incurred may be directly measured
against benefits achieved.
Unfortunately, this fundamental principle has not always been observed in federal
housing policy. Indeed, political expediency or other non-economic criteria have
as often dictated policy as long-range criteria of appropriate private/public or cost/
benefit balance. This has meant that the approach of federal housing and urban
revitalization programs has not infrequently been piecemeal and uncoordinated. It
has meant the accumulation of federal aids, including direct grants, loans, and mortgage insurance, in programs which have tended to supplant, rather than to supplement, private credit. And it has meant that costs have too often been obscured,
while concentrating on benefits obtained.
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i. The Submarket Interest Rate Approach: A Violation of Basic Precepts
One basic approach to housing problems which violates both criteria of maximum
private participation and cost/benefit balance is the use of "submarket" interest rates
in federally underwritten mortgage lending programs. This approach of making
credit available at rates well below the private market is used to subsidize housing
costs for low- and middle-income families. It is widely recognized, of course, that
such below-market rate loans insured by the Federal Housing Administration and
"purchased" by the Federal National Mortgage Association represent a thinlydisguised substitute for direct federal lending.
Admittedly, the submarket rate approach to housing problems is an administratively convenient and politically expedient device to achieve subsidies for
families unable to compete in the private market place. But in the long run it is
a snare and a delusion. It does not permit the use of private credit, so desperately
needed to supplement public funds if low-cost housing programs are to expand
significantly. It effectively obscures actual subsidy costs, so necessary to judge the
efficiency and usefulness of the program relative to benefits achieved.
I regard the submarket interest rate approach as bad public policy even when
associated with direct federal loans. Such loans, sometimes essential to fill a private
housing credit gap, ought to be offered at going rates of interest-consistent with
federal borrowing costs at least-to borrowers unable, for one or another reason,
to secure private funds on competitive terms. Another dimension is added when
hidden cost subsidies, as well as direct public credit, are provided through the submarket interest rate technique.
If interest rate subsidies-in addition to public credit-are deemed sound public
policy, they should be provided directly and accepted as a measurable social cost.
One way of doing this is to have private lenders extend credit at market rates of
interest, with the difference between the market rate and subsidized rate to borrowers
paid directly to financial institutions by government. In this way, private credit
sources would be tapped (reducing the need for public funds) and the actual subsidy
costs (interest rate differential) of the program would be directly measurable.
In sum, current submarket interest rate housing programs ought to be gradually
eliminated because (i) they preempt rather than supplement the use of private credit,
and (2) they obscure actual subsidy costs and thus hinder their measure against
benefits achieved.
The Rent Supplement Approach: In Support of Basic Precepts
In sharp contrast to the below-market rate program, the relatively new rent supplement program directly supports sound basic principles of public policy in urban
revitalization. In this program, maximum reliance is placed on the private sector
to achieve a desired public objective. The rental housing provided for low-income
2.

PUBLIC/PRIVATE

APPROACHES

To HOUSING

263

families is privately built, privately owned, and privately financed, at market prices
and interest rates. And, the supplemental rent payments represent subsidy costs
openly measurable against benefits received, not obscured through hidden interestrate subsidies in federal credits.
When the rent supplement program was proposed in 1965, there was at long last
implicit federal recognition that both the concept and practicality of the submarket
interest rate approach were found wanting. In transmitting the Housing and
Urban Development Act of 1965 to the Congress, President Johnson said:'
Up to now Government programs for low- and moderate-income families have concentrated on either direct financing of construction; or on making below-themarket-rate loans to private builders....
...If [the rent supplement program] works as well as we expect, it should be
possible to phase out most of our existing programs of low-interest loans.

The President, in his 1965 message on the central city and its suburbs, also stated:
"[W]e must recognize that the benefits of [below-market interest rate programs] are
decreasing as the rising costs of Federal borrowing narrows the difference between

the interest we ask and that demanded in the private market."9
When they were made two years ago, these statements represented, in my judgment, a major step forward in the direction of federal housing policy-a significant
turn towards increased reliance on the private sector. I was aware, of course,
of the practical problems of discontinuing submarket interest rate programs before
the rent supplement and other proposed private/public direct subsidy programs had
been proven successful. Now, two years later, I must confess to some disappointment.
The rent supplement program has run into serious congressional obstacles.

Its concept is not fully appreciated, its working apparatus considered discouragingly
complex. As a result, the program has been operating on minimum funds. Until
this program is well funded and given an opportunity to prove its worth, the submarket interest rate program, unfortunately, is likely to remain the basic approach
to the low-income housing problem, in violation of fundamental principles of private/
public partnership and cost/benefit balance.
B. The Concept and Philosophy of Federal Mortgage Insurance
In the broad range of urban programs, current and proposed, one of those longest

in operation stands out as the epitome of the creative partnership between the
private and public sectors. I refer, of course, to federal mortgage insurance, established
over three decades ago, and operated so successfully through the Federal Housing
Administration. With respect to the cost/benefit balance, moreover, the FHA pro-

gram is entirely self-sustaining through income from insurance premiums.
' H.R. Doc. No. 99, 89th Cong., ist Sess. 7-8 (1965).
0
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both counts, then, federal mortgage insurance deserves to be the principal credit aid
in the revitalization of our cities.
There is a body of private market opinion, however, which disagrees with this
view. It holds that for FHA to assume the high risks inherent in urban rebuilding
programs is to forsake the basic business principle underlying its creation-the
insurance of economically sound residential mortgage credits. In this view, the
fundamental concept and philosophy of federal mortgage insurance is violated when
FHA moves into areas outside of standard single-family housing and multi-family
projects.
This is a rather parochial and short-sighted position to take, however, in a rapidly
changing urban scene. It confuses purposes and objectives with specific programs
undertaken to attain them. It will be recalled that the FHA was etablished in the
depths of the Great Depression (1934) to stimulate the construction of new housing
and the repair and modernization of existing housing, in part to provide new employment opportunities. Federal mortgage insurance was the new tool invented to encourage the flow of private credit into markets which, in retrospect, had proven to be
excessively risky. The approach was new, daring, and imaginative; the objective was
to renew and broaden the residential mortgage market with a viable, modern credit
instrument. The cornerstone and prerequisite of the new federal mortgage insurance
program was "economic soundness."
In the almost uninterrupted three-decade rise in real estate values which has
followed its establishment, FHA has become a resounding business success. Its
philosophy, concepts, and objectives have been proven sound. And once proven, they
have been embraced by private lenders and investors, now entering markets not
earlier dared without federal mortgage insurance.
In today's new urban environment, with its new problems and needs, however,
FHA's principal concept and objectives are not well served by continuing to plow
old fields, by operating solely in already proven markets, such as single-family
suburban housing. Only by pursuing new programs, in fact, does FHA fulfill its
original purpose-to open up new markets and opportunities with private resources,
which otherwise might be long deferred or developed eventually only with public
funds.
In essence, FHA serves its most useful-and originally intended-function when
it operates on the frontiers of housing and mortgage markets. It must innovate. It
must be cognizant of changing market patterns and unmet needs and, through the
insurance technique, channel resources into areas where private industry still fears
to tread alone. To follow this course is to break new paths in the original FHA
tradition. Not to follow it is to retrogress into a shell of safe, proven markets until
the fundamental reason for federal mortgage insurance disappears.
In this frame of reference, no program is better suited to the fulfillment of
FHA's basic principles and objectives than the urban revitalization program. And
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no technique is better suited than federal mortgage insurance-at market rates of
interest-to maximize the use of private resources to achieve broadly accepted public
goals.
Few tasks have greater economic and social significance than the rebuilding of
our urban complex. And few tasks confront private lenders and investors with
greater risks in their initial stages of development. These ingredients are tailor-made
for the use of federal risk-sharing aids. Once urban rebuilding programs are proven
economically sound, the willingness of private industry to participate alone will
increase and the need for federal assistance will be reduced.
The acceptance of greater risks inherent in broad new urban programs means,
of course, that a larger proportion of the contingent liabilities borne by the federal
government through mortgage insurance may ultimately turn into real liabilities. But
this is a burden that a federal insurance agency and the American community should
be willing to bear, if the objective sought is worth the risk entailed. The logic
appears unassailable, then, that federal mortgage insurance ought to be centered on
those urban investments which are riskier than alternative private market opportunities but which have a strong long-range base of economic soundness.
C. The Need for a Public/Private Administrative Structure
In concluding this article, I cannot resist the temptation of dusting off an administrative proposal, which I have had occasion to recommend elsewhere. There is a
need for a voluntary public/private administrative network-at national, state, and
local levels-in which public agencies and private groups jointly plan, develop, and
implement programs and policies for urban rebuilding. Such an administrative
structure might operate within "Councils of Urban Rebuilding Enterprises" (CURE).
This would give specific administrative recognition to the existence of a creative
public/private partnership. The existence of CURE, moreover, would recognize
that private institutions have more to contribute than money to the massive task of
urban revitalization. They have imaginative and technical skills as well.
Such a creative public/private structure is, of course, not an entirely new concept.
Similar administrative arrangements have been adopted before at various levels of
government and with various degrees of success. There is much that can be learned
from the function of these earlier administrative arrangements-both the successful
and unsuccessful. The important thing is that through a continuing, cooperative
administrative organization, old battle lines between public and private forces might
more quickly disintegrate. This, of course, is the essential ingredient to the forging
of a meaningful, operative, public/private partnership.

